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Abstract
This paper attempts to isolate the conditions that give rise to loss
leader pricing. I show that for su¢ ciently low distance between rms,
the advertised good is priced below cost irrespective of whether rms
advertise the same or di¤erent products. Instead, if products are suf-
ciently di¤erentiated, loss leader pricing may result only if rms ad-
vertise the low reservation value product, otherwise the advertised good
is a low margin leader. Thus, whether the advertised good is a loss
leader or a low margin leader is primarily a function of the extent of
di¤erentiation between competing rms.
Keywords: Informative advertising, loss leader, low margin leader, product
di¤erentiation
JEL Classication: L13; L15; M37
1 Introduction
Advertising (both price and nonprice) provides information to consumers and
thus helps direct them to the rms where they potentially get the greatest
surplus. In this way, both consumers and rms potentially benet from adver-
tising (Bagwell and Ramey; 1994a, 1994b). For this reason, the relationship
between advertising and prices and advertising and prots has long been a
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subject of great interest to economists and thus has spawned a huge literature.
Important contributions include Benham (1972), Butters (1977) and Grossman
and Shapiro (1984). A common nding in this literature is the negative associ-
ation between advertising and prices (Benham, 1972; Grossman and Shapiro,
1984; Bagwell and Ramey, 1994a, 1994b; Milyo and Waldfogel, 1999; among
others).
In most theoretical studies however, each rm is assumed to sell a single
product. This severely limits both the scope of applications of the ndings as
well as the scope of interactions between advertising and prices (for instance,
the pervasive issue of loss leader pricing can not be studied in single product
rms). In contrast to the theoretical literature, both empirical evidence (Milyo
and Waldfogel, 1999; Walters and Mackenzie, 1988) and casual observation
support the hypothesis that rms advertise only a subset of their products.1
The analysis of advertising becomes more fruitful (in terms of the rich-
ness of the behaviours that can be analysed) when one considers multiproduct
rms. In this setting, advertising can be used both as a source of information
for consumers and also as a tool to extract more consumer surplus through
a careful selection of the products to advertise and astute pricing of the ad-
vertised and the non-advertised products. The advertised goods could be sold
at a loss (loss-leader good) or the rm could simply reduce the margins on
the advertised goods but still sell at a prot (low margin leader good).2 This
paper attempts to understand the conditions that lead to the advertised good
1There are several reasons why rms may want to advertise only a handful of their prod-
ucts (Ellison, 2005; pages 607-611). One obvious reason is that many rms, especially retail
rms, carry hundreds if not thousands of products and therefore printing an encyclopaedia
(read brochure) to communicate all the prices would be very costly and even more, the in-
tended readers may be put o¤ by the shear size of the brochure. Another possible rationale
for advertising only a subset of the products is the desire of rms to create some ambiguity
in the minds of consumers which the rms can capitalize on. The failure by rms to avail
all the information to consumers generates a need for consumer search. However if search
is costly, either consumer search will be limited or consumers will solely rely on the little
information provided by the rms. In either case, rms can potentially exploit the ambiguity
resulting from the less than full search.
2A good is termed a loss (low margin) leader if it is deliberately priced below marginal
cost (low but above marginal cost) in order to attract consumers to the advertising store
and hence promote sales of higher margin products. According to Investopedia, "A classic
example [of a loss leader] is that of razor blades. Companies like Gillette essentially give
their razor units away for free, knowing that customers will have to buy their replacement
blades, which is where the company makes all of its prot. Another example is Microsofts
Xbox video game system, which was sold at a loss of more than $100 per unit to create more
potential to prot from the sale of higher-margin video games." (investopedia.com)
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being priced below cost (loss leader) or above cost (low margin leader). The
central question is: Why are the leader products sometimes priced below mar-
ginal cost (sold at a loss) and sometimes priced above marginal cost? In other
words, when or under what conditions should we expect the leader good to be
sold at a loss? In particular, what is the role of the extent of di¤erentiation
between the competing rms in the loss leader - low margin leader story? I
also study the implications of leader pricing for rm prots.
I consider two rms, each selling two products but only advertising a single
product. The rms are located at the end points of a linear city of unit length.
Consumers (who are uniformly distributed on the unit interval) are assumed
to be completely uninformed about prices and rm locations (products) unless
they are reached by advertising. In other words, I am assuming that search
costs are prohibitive so that consumers do not actively engage in informa-
tion acquisition activities. Following Butters (1977), advertising messages are
randomly distributed over consumers.
I show that loss-leader pricing crucially depends on how strong competition
between the rms is. The strength of competition between the rms is a
function of both advertising and the degree of product di¤erentiation. For
su¢ ciently low distance between the competing rms, the advertised good is
priced below cost, irrespective of whether rms advertise the same or di¤erent
products. If instead products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, the advertised
good is priced above marginal cost.
It turns out that the extent of marketing is not a¤ected by the choice of
the advertised product. The advertising intensity is the same whether rms
advertise similar or di¤erent products. Equally, prots are not a¤ected by the
choice of the advertised product. Hence, in equilibrium rms will randomly
select the good to advertise. The intuition for this result is as follows: Since all
consumers have the same reservation value for each product and the reservation
value is perfectly known to all (consumers and rms), the advertised price
provides a su¢ cient statistic for the consumers expected surplus. As a result,
it does not matter for the consumers visitation decision whether rms advertise
the same or di¤erent products.
Closely related are Lal and Matutes (1994) who study price and advertising
by multiproduct rms and Ellison (2005) who studies a vertically di¤erentiated
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goods model in which rms only advertise the low quality good.3 However,
neither Lal and Matutes nor Ellison explicitly model the advertising decision.
Generally, when rms advertise, the post advertising equilibrium is character-
ized by a market partitioned into segments of variably informed consumers
and this has additional implications for rm pricing. Moreover, both Lal and
Matutes and Ellison only consider the case where the market is fully covered.
However, as Soberman (2004) shows, for some constellations of the di¤erenti-
ation parameter, some informed consumers nd it protable not to purchase.
Also related is Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) who study dissipative advertis-
ing. They show that "ostensibly uninformative" advertising may bring about
coordination economies. These coordination economies manifest themselves in
the form of greater demand to the rm and lower prices to consumers. Thus,
they nd a negative association between advertising and price. We di¤er with
them in several ways: First, in our model, advertising is (directly) informative
whereas in theirs, it is not. Secondly, whereas in our model rms advertise
only a subset of the products they sell, in theirs, they neither advertise the
prices nor the products they sell. Rather, rms advertise for instance, their
size. Also, in Bagwell and Ramey, product di¤erentiation is unimportant.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Sections
3 and 4 examine price and advertising when rms advertise the same and
respectively di¤erent products and di¤erentiation is low. Section 5 studies
price and advertising when di¤erentiation is high and section 6 concludes.
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Model
The model extends the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model as simplied
by Tirole (1988) in two dimensions, viz, rms sell multiple products and I
allow for the market not to be covered in equilibrium. Consider a linear city
of unit length served by two rms, rm 0 and rm 1; where each rms iden-
tity corresponds to its location. Each rm sells two products, product 1 and
product 2 which are either complements or independent but not substitutes.
3This paper draws freely from Simbanegavi (2005).
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However, across rms, the products are substitutes.4 Firms advertise only one
of their products. Firms randomly sent out advertisements to consumers. Let
i denote the advertising (ad) reach of rm i; i = 0; 1: The cost of reaching
fraction i of consumers is a
2
i =2; a > t=2:
5 Each good is produced at a con-
stant marginal cost, c; and rms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose
prices and advertising intensities to maximize prots. There is no entry or exit
and there are no xed costs. Product di¤erentiation is exogenous.
Consumers (who are rational) are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] according
to taste. That is, each consumer is identied by a point on the unit inter-
val that corresponds to her most preferred brand. I assume that consumers
are completely unaware of the existence of rms or products unless they are
reached by advertising. I also assume that search costs are prohibitive so
that consumers do not actively engage in information acquisition activities.
Each informed consumer buys at most one unit of each product and unin-
formed consumers stay out of the market. A unit of good 1(2) generates gross
surplus of v1(v2) and consumers incur a shopping cost of t per unit distance. If
an informed consumer chooses not to purchase, they get zero surplus. Trans-
portation costs are applied to both goods (bundling) the decision to visit a
particular store is based on the expected surplus from buying at that store.
2.2 Timing
The timing of the actions is as follows: In stage 1, rms simultaneously decide
on the advertised price and the advertising level, and send out the ads. In stage
2, consumers receive ads and make purchase plans based on the advertised price
and the expected price of the non-advertised good. At the same time, rms
simultaneously decide on the price of the non-advertised good. Lastly, in stage
3, purchases are made and payo¤s are realized.
2.3 Preliminaries
Given the advertising intensities 0 and 1 : fraction 01 of consumers receive
advertising messages from both rms (fully informed); fraction i
 
1  j

; i; j =
4Think of, for example, two retail stores which specialize one in Philips products (TV
and video camera) and the other in Sony products (TV and video camera).
5The parameter t (which is dened below) measures the transportation cost incurred by
consumers when visiting a store.
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0; 1; j 6= i receive ads from rm i but not rm j (partially informed) and frac-
tion (1  0) (1  1) receive no ads from either rm (uninformed). I assume
that 01 is large enough so that rms nd it worthwhile to compete for the
fully informed consumers.6
Suppose rm i advertises good k and rm j advertises good `; so that pik
and pj` are the advertised prices for rms i and j respectively. Let pEi` and
pEjk denote the expected prices of the non-advertised products at rms i and
j; respectively, k; ` = 1; 2. If the rms advertise the same good, say good k;
then there are three possible congurations of the expected prices of good `;
the non-advertised good: Either pEi` = p
E
j`; p
E
i` < p
E
j` or p
E
i` > p
E
j`: Since the non-
advertised products are (physically) similar and the consumers are rational,
the most reasonable beliefs that consumers can have are that pEi` = p
E
j`: Hence
I assume that pEi` = p
E
j`:
The problem can be solved backwards, starting with stage 2.7 In the sec-
ond stage, having committed itself to the advertised price, rm is problem is to
choose the non-advertised price, pi`; to maximize (pi`   c)Di
 
pik; pj`; p
E
i`; p
E
jk; i; j

.
Observe that the demand that rm i faces is independent of pi`; the non-
advertised price.8 Since demand is determined by the advertised prices and
the expected prices pEi` and p
E
jk, it follows that prots are maximized by ensur-
ing that all visiting consumers buy the non-advertised good, that is, by setting
pi` = p
E
i`; i = 0; 1:
As for consumers, the decision to visit a store is based on expected sur-
plus. The uncertainty here derives from the fact that one of the goods they
anticipate purchasing is not advertised  and hence the price is not known
with certainty. A fully informed consumer located at x 2 (0; 1) gets expected
surplus vk + v`   pik   pEi`   tx buying from rm i and surplus vk + v`  
pj`   pEjk   t (1  x) buying from rm j. Thus, rm i faces demand Dfulli =
ij
 
pj` + p
E
jk   pik   pEi` + t

=2t; j 6= i from the fully informed consumers.
Partially informed consumers purchase whenever it is individually rational to
do so. Let yi denote the location of a consumer who receives only rm is ad(s).
Buying yields surplus vk + v`   pik   pEi`   tyi. Given the consumersoutside
option, rm i thus faces demand Dpartiali = i
 
1  j
  
vk + v`   pik   pEi`

=t
6If this assumption is not satised, a symmetric equilibrium may not exist as at least one
rm may nd it protable to charge a high price and only serve its captive consumers.
7Stage 3 is superuous. It is only meant to close the model.
8Of course the actual quantity demanded of the non-advertised good depends on pi`:
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from the partially informed consumers.
So what is pEi`? I use a standard argument to deduce this. Observe that in
equilibrium consumersexpectations for the non-advertised good must coincide
with the actual price charged by rm i for this good: As a matter of fact, in
this model, if rms did not advertise at all, the market would unravel for
the simple reason that consumers would foresee themselves being held to the
reservation prices once search costs are sunk (Lal and Matutes, 1994; Bagwell,
2005; p.75). Therefore by extension, rational consumers must anticipate being
held to the reservation value of the non-advertised good once they are in the
store. It follows therefore that pEi` = v`; i = 0; 1; ` = 1; 2: Hence, pi` = p
E
i` = v`:
Firm i thus faces the demand:
Di = i
 
1  j

(vk   pik) =t+ j (pj`   pik + vk   v` + t) =2t

; i 6= j: (1)
If rms advertise the same good however, the demand reduces to
Di = i
 
1  j

(vk   pik) =t+ j (pj`   pik + t) =2t

: (1)
For what follows, I make the following assumption:
Assumption A1. c+
p
2at < min fv1; v2g :
Assumption A1 ensures that in equilibrium consumers visit the stores in
the single product case. If the equilibrium price is greater than or equal to
min fv1; v2g ; visiting consumers get negative surplus since they incur positive
transportation costs and hence no consumer would visit a store.9
3 Low di¤erentiation
In this section I assume low di¤erentiation. That is, I assume that the market is
fully covered, i.e., the consumer who travels the furthest distance (unit interval)
nds it protable to purchase). The market is covered when vk  pik + t: This
says that the gross surplus from purchasing a unit of good k at rm i exceeds
the total cost of purchasing this good at rm i for the consumer who travels the
9This assumption is implicit in the analyses of, for example, Bagwell (2005; Section. 5),
Tirole (1988; Chap. 7) and Soberman (2004).
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furthest distance.10 It follows therefore that all consumers who receive at least
one ad from rm i will make a purchase. That is, eyi  vk pikt = 1: The demand
function (1) reduces to Di = i
 
1  j

+ j (vk   v` + pj`   pik + t) =2t

:
3.1 Price and Advertising
Assume that rm i advertises good k and rm j advertises good `; i; j =
0; 1; i 6= j and k; ` = 1; 2. Then, rm is prot is:
i = maxfpik;ig

(pik + v`   2c)

i
 
1  j

+
ij (vk   v` + pj`   pik + t)
2t

  a
2
i
2

:
(2)
Observe that our formulation allows for the rms to advertise the same
product. In this case, vk = v` and rm is objective function becomes
i = maxfpik;ig

(pik + v`   2c)

i
 
1  j

+
ij (pjk   pik + t)
2t

  a
2
i
2

:
Di¤erentiating (2) with respect to pik and i gives
@i
@pik
= 2t+ pj`j + (2c  2pik   t+ vk   2v`)j = 0; (3)
@i
@i
= 0:11
Equation (3) gives the relation between prices and advertising. One of
the features that distinguishes the present model from the models of Lal and
Matutes (1994) and Ellison (2005) is that in the present model, consumers
are ex-post heterogeneous some receive ads and some dont. In other words,
although all consumers are ex-ante uninformed, ex-post they are di¤erentially
informed  some are fully informed of all advertised prices, others are only
partially informed and yet others are not informed at all. In contrast, in
Lal and Matutes and respectively Ellisons works, all consumers are ex-post
fully informed as regards to the advertised prices. Below I characterize the
relationship between the advertised prices and the advertising intensity.
Proposition 1 Irrespective of whether rms advertise the same or di¤erent
10In equilibrium, the non-advertised good yields zero expected surplus and hence doesnt
a¤ect the visitation decision.
11 @i
@i
=
 
(pik   pj`   2c+ t  vk + 2v`) pik + v2` + 2pj`c  2ct+ 2cvk   pj`v`   2cv` + tv`   vkv`

j 
2tv` + 4ct  2pikt+ 2ati = 0
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products, there is a negative association between advertising and prices. That
is,
@pik
@
< 0; i = 0; 1; k = 1; 2:
Proof. From the rst order conditions for rms i and j; we get that @i
@pik
= 2t+
pj`j+(2c  2pik   t+ vk   2v`)j = 0 and @j@pj` = 2t+piki+(2c  2pj`   t+ v`   2vk)i =
0: Solving rm js rst order condition for pj` gives pj` = 12i (2t  i ( 2c+ t+ 2vk   v`) + ipik) :
Substituting this value into the rst order condition for rm i; and solving for
pik gives pik =   1 (t  2c  2t+ v`) (assuming i = j = ). Finally,
di¤erentiating pik with respect to  yields:
@pik
@
=  2 t
2
< 0:
This result is similar to the nding of Grossman and Shapiro (1984). A
rm that advertises more expects a larger demand and hence can a¤ord to
lower prices (Bagwell and Ramey, 1994a). Intuitively, a rm that advertises
more will have more consumers in the competitors backyard aware of its prod-
uct. In order to induce these consumers to ditch the nearby rm in favour of
the distant rm, the distant rm must compensate these consumers for the
additional search costs they incur. Ideally the rm would want to give tar-
geted discounts to these consumers (consumers in the competitors backyard).
However, because advertising cannot be targeted (i.e., price discrimination is
not feasible), the rm can only compensate these consumers by charging lower
prices and thus assuring them greater expected surplus.
Evaluating the rst order conditions gives:
pk = 2c+
p
2at  v` (4)
i = j = 2=

1 +
p
2a=t

(5)
 = 2a=

1 +
p
2a=t
2
: (6)
Two results follow:
Proposition 2 When rms advertise the same good, the advertised good is
priced below cost irrespective of whether rms advertise the low or the high
reservation price good. The non-advertised good is priced at its reservation
price.
Proof. From (4), pk = 2c+
p
2at  v` = c+
p
2at  (v`   c) : Clearly, pk < c
if and only if
p
2at   (v`   c) < 0 and
p
2at   (v`   c) < 0 if and only if
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c +
p
2at < v`. But this is nothing other than Assumption 1. Hence, we
conclude that indeed pk < c. The second part of the proposition is already
shown in section 2.3.
Since consumers do not actively search in this model, market shares are
determined solely by the advertised prices. Holding the rms advertising reach
constant, the lower the advertised price the higher the consumersexpected
surplus and hence the greater the likelihood that each ad received results in a
sale.
When rms advertise the low reservation value good, competition for mar-
ket share is tougher as the rm that succeeds in attracting more consumers will
sell more units at the higher non-advertised price. The larger the di¤erence
between the reservation values the greater the incentive to undercut. Given
low di¤erentiation, this leads to a much lower equilibrium advertised price.
When rms advertise the high reservation price good instead, there are two
opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, low di¤erentiation induces rms to com-
pete more aggressively for market share (products are similar). On the other
hand, rms realize that visiting consumers will pay a lower (reservation) price
on the non-advertised good and this restrains the aggression. However, the
low di¤erentiation e¤ect dominates and rms advertise prices below marginal
cost in either case.
Examples of markets in which di¤erentiation is generally low are the gro-
cery retail market and the liquor retail market. Supermarkets, for instance,
sell products that are almost (if not exactly) physically similar. Competition
therefore is mainly on prices. Because they carry similar products, consumers
do not have a strong inclination to buy from one particular store as opposed
to another and, as a result, price competition is intense. Moreover, when rms
advertise similar products, there is even more downward pressure on the adver-
tised prices since advertising similar products facilitates comparison shopping.
The presence of non-advertised products further exacerbates price competition
since rms anticipate earning higher prots from the sale of the higher mar-
gin non-advertised products. This intense price competition results in rms
o¤ering loss leaders.
We next consider the equilibrium price and advertising congurations when
rms advertise di¤erent products. The question here is whether advertising
di¤erent products softens price competition. One is tempted to answer this
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question in the a¢ rmative as advertising di¤erent products ideally reduces
comparison shopping. The following proposition however shows that this is
not the case. In particular,
Proposition 3 When rms advertise di¤erent products the advertised prices
are asymmetric  the rm advertising a higher reservation value good quotes
a higher advertised price. However, the advertised prices are below marginal
cost and the extent of marketing and prots are exactly the same as when rms
advertise the same product.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is straightforward. The incentives to
attract consumers to the store are driven by the expected prot from the sale
of the non-advertised good. When rm i advertises the low reservation value
good (say good 1), the incentive to attract consumers is greatest as each visiting
consumer will pay v2: Consequently, the rm advertises a much lower price.
In contrast rm j, which advertises the high reservation value good (good
2), advertises a higher price. This is meant to compensate for the fact that
visiting consumers will only pay v1; which is lower. Thus the rm advertising
the high reservation value good will have a higher advertised price. Consumers
understand this and thus will not be fooled by rm is low advertised price12.
Proposition 3 is driven mainly by two factors: First, rms know consumers
reservation values and second, consumersexpectations are correct in equilib-
rium. Although each rm only advertises one product among its o¤erings,
rational consumers already know the non-advertised prices. Hence, the out-
come is as if both goods were advertised.
The above results allow us to rationalize the "surprising" nding of Walters
and MacKenzie (1988) that, in retail markets, loss-leader pricing fails to stim-
ulate store tra¢ c and hence is unprotable. Walters and MacKenzie interpret
their nding as "pointing to the fact that locational convenience and overall
price perceptions are more important determinants of patronage than weekly
specials" (p. 60). I turn their explanation on its head. Because di¤erentiation
is typically low in the retail sector, weekly specials are crucial determinants of
12Because rms cannot commit to not eece consumers once search costs are sunk, they
have to o¤er price discounts as a way to commit to leave consumers su¢ cient surplus to
make the shopping trip worthwhile.
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visitation13. As a result, a rm that o¤ers such specials would substantially
increase its market share if rivals would not follow suit. Realizing this, rms
always try to match price cutting by rivals and this enables them to maintain
their market shares.
This is a typical prisoners dilemma. A rm that succeeds in undercutting
its rival can greatly increase its prots since it then faces a large demand
and sells the non-advertised good at its reservation price. On the other hand,
if both rms undercut (symmetrically), then each rm maintains its market
share. In this sense, undercutting is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each
individual rm. However, this strategy does not maximize joint prots and
rms settle for an equilibrium with low advertised prices but with the same
level of demand.14 This makes loss-leader pricing appear as if it were less
important.15 I nd the present argument more convincing, for if price specials
were unimportant, why are retailers "placing greater emphasis on hotter price
specials"? (Lal and Matutes, 1994; p. 345).16
4 High di¤erentiation (Regime H)
In the previous section, I studied the case when di¤erentiation is low; that
is, vk   pik   t > 0; where pik is the advertised price. For such parameter
constellations, all consumers who receive at least one advertising message from
rm i will make a purchase as they are guaranteed positive surplus from doing
so. However, as Soberman (2004) notes, for some parameter constellations,
some informed consumers may optimally choose not to purchase. This happens
13When I asked him why they advertised so frequently in the newspaper (weekly basis),
the manager of a large non-food retail chain in Cape Town candidly responded "If we did
not advertise, instead of 8000 customers over the weekend, we would only get about 4000.
So you can see why".
14That loss leader pricing does not increase demand in our model is a consequence of the
unit demands assumption. With downward sloping demands, total demand can increase in
equilibrium but market shares will not.
15Since competitors always match price cutting by rivals, the full e¤ect of loss leader
pricing on store tra¢ c and prots is never realized in equilibrium. This gives a biased
reading of the importance of loss leader pricing. This suggests a di¤erent empirical method
to test for the e¤ect of loss leader pricing  counterfactual analysis. What would be the
e¤ect on prots of rm i were competitors to not reciprocate when rm i lowers its price?
16I asked a manager of a major food retail chain why they advertise and the answer I got
pretty much conrms the intuition above. She responded that "its the competition thing.
If we dont frequently advertise to inform our consumers of the specials we have they will
go to those stores that advertise".
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whenever the parameter values are such that t=2 < vk   pik < t: This is
the condition for high di¤erentiation (Soberman, 2004) or the condition for
incomplete (market) coverage (Hamilton, 2004).
In this section, I consider the case when di¤erentiation is high. Di¤eren-
tiation is said to be high if, given the prices, at least one partially informed
consumer does not make a purchase. In the double inequality above, the con-
dition: vk   pik < t tells us that the consumer located at rm j but who only
receives advertising messages from rm i would get negative surplus were they
to travel to rm i since the consumer surplus is less than the transportation
costs. Hence, this consumer will not purchase, even though they are informed.
The other condition: t=2 < vk pik tells us that a consumer located in between
the two rms who travels distance no more that t=2 to go to rm i will purchase
whenever they receive at least one advertising message. These conditions give
the degree of product di¤erentiation compatible with highdi¤erentiation. In
particular, under high di¤erentiation, the degree of product di¤erentiation is
such that t 2

v1+v2
2
  c; 2(v1+v2 2c)
3

and the demand that rm i faces is given
by equation (1) exactly.17
The objective, as before, is to try to pin down the conditions that cause the
leader good (advertised good) to be priced below cost or to be a low margin
leader. To proceed, suppose rm i advertises good k and rm j advertises good
`; so that the advertised prices are respectively pik and pj`; k; ` = 1; 2; i 6= j:
Firm i and rm j s objective functions are then:
Hi = max
pik;i
(pik + v`   2c)i
 
1  j
 vk   pik
t
+ j
pj` + vk   pik   v` + t
2t

 a
2
i
2
(7)
Hj = max
pj`;j
(pj` + vk   2c)j

(1  i)
v`   pj`
t
+ i
pik + v`   pj`   vk + t
2t

 a
2
j
2
:
(8)
Observe that our formulation allows for the case where rms advertise the
17In regime H; we have that t=2 < vk p < t: The rst inequality, evaluated at the
full information (highest) price, gives the upper bound to regime H while the second
inequality gives the lower bound. Evaluating this condition at pH1F= t+ 2c  v2 gives
t 2

v1+v2
2   c; 2(v1+v2 2c)3

:
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same good, good k. In this case, rm is problem reduces to
Hi = max
pik;i
(pik + v`   2c)i
 
1  j
 vk   pik
t
+ j
pjk   pik + t
2t

 a
2
i
2
:
(9)
Consider rst the case when the rms advertise the same good. Di¤erenti-
ating with respect to pik and then solving for pik (at the symmetric equilibrium:
pik = pjk = pk and i = j = ) one gets:
18
pk = [4c+ 2 (vk   v`) + (t  2c  (2vk   v`))] = (4  3) : (10)
Equation (10) gives the equilibrium price as a function of the advertising
intensity19: A careful analysis of (10) shows that loss-leader pricing is possible
under high di¤erentiation. More precisely, let k = ` so that rms advertise the
same product. Then,
Proposition 4 Let the rms advertise the same product. When rms adver-
tise the low reservation value good, equilibrium may entail loss-leader pricing
even when rmsproducts are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (high di¤erentiation).
However, when rms advertise the high reservation value good, the advertised
price exceeds marginal cost (low margin leader).
Proof. Let rms advertise good k so that pk is the advertised price. Notice
that (from (10)) @pk=@t > 0: Since t > t = v1+v22   c; it follows that pk =
4c+t 2c+2(vi vj) (2vi vj)
4 3 > pk jt=t  pk = c +
(vk   v`)
2
; k; ` = 1; 2; k 6= `: If
vk < v`; advertising good k (the low reservation price good) gives pk < c: Thus,
for t !  v1+v2
2
  c+ and for jvk   v`j large, pk < c: However, if vk > v`; then
advertising good k (the high reservation price good) gives pk > c and hence
pk > c:
The intuition for this result is as follows: when di¤erentiation is high, price
advertising is primarily informative. Products are less similar and therefore
price di¤erences have to be large to induce consumers to switch to the distant
18Due to complexity of the rst order conditions, we cannot solve explicitly for pik; pj`;
i and j :
19In contrast to Proposition 2, the relation between price and advertising is positive when
di¤erentiation is high (Soberman, 2004). When products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated, de-
mand is more elastic in the presence of informational product di¤erentiation. Higher adver-
tising, by increasing the share of fully informed consumers, reduces overall demand elasticity
and thus allows rms to charge higher prices.
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supplier. However, for t !  v1+v2
2
  c+ ; most partially informed consumers
make a purchase and thus competition for market share can be intense. A
higher non-advertised price adds to the incentives to compete vigorously. Thus,
when rms advertise the low reservation price good, undercutting may result in
prices below cost. However, when products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (t is
high), the incentive to undercut is reduced. Hence, for large t; rms advertise
prices above marginal cost when they advertise the low valuation good. When
rms advertise the high reservation price good however, it is never optimal
to advertise prices below marginal cost. The fact that di¤erentiation is high
(products are less similar) and the fact that the non-advertised (reservation)
price is lower when rms advertise the high reservation price good both induce
rms to advertise higher prices.
I next consider the case when rms advertise di¤erent products. As argued
earlier, advertising di¤erent products potentially has additional implications
as it reduces comparison shopping. Di¤erentiating (7) and respectively (8)
with respect to pik and respectively pj` and solving simultaneously for pk and
p`; k 6= ` yields,20
pk = [4c+ 2 (vk   v`) + (t  2c  (2vk   v`))] = (4  3) (11)
p
`
= [4c+ 2 (v`   vk) + (t  2c  (2v`   vk))] = (4  3) (12)
It turns out that the equilibrium advertised prices are exactly the same as
when rms advertise the same product (observe that the expressions for pk
in (10) and (11) are identical). It is therefore immediate from the proof of
Proposition 4 that loss leader pricing is possible only for the rm advertising
the low reservation value good. It follows therefore that if rm i advertises
good k while rm j advertises good `; and good k happens to be the low
reservation value good, then for t!  vk+v`
2
  c+ and for jvk   v`j large, pk < c:
That is, loss leader pricing is possible, depending on the extent of product
di¤erentiation. However, for rm j; which advertises good `; pj` jt=t = c  vk v`2 :
Since vk < v`; it follows that the lowest price that can be charged by rm j
exceeds the marginal cost. Thus, rm js advertised good is a lowmargin leader
 independent of the degree of product di¤erentiation. The intuition is the
same as when rms advertise the same product: the rm advertising the high
20I suppress subscripts i and j:
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reservation value good realizes that visiting consumers will only pay a lower
(reservation) price for the non-advertised good hence the diminished incentive
to lower the advertised price. However, because advertising is necessary for
visitation, the asking price has to be below the reservation price. This explains
low margin leader pricing.
In the present model advertising serves as a commitment device: it guar-
antees consumers su¢ cient surplus to make the visitation worthwhile (Lal and
Matutes, 1994). Firms however, tend to overcommit. Overcommitment is more
pronounced when rmsproducts are similar as it implies loss leader pricing.
When products are su¢ ciently di¤erent, the advertised good is a low margin
leader but not a loss leader. The distinction being that for a low margin leader
the price is lower than would be the case if advertising was not necessary but
still price exceeds marginal cost. Thus, from Propositions 1, 3 and 4 we can
pin down the conditions that give rise to loss leader pricing.
Corollary 1 The following conditions are su¢ cient for loss-leader pricing;
(i) Low di¤erentiation and (ii) Firms advertise only a subset of their
products.
Our nding that when di¤erentiation is low it is immaterial for loss leader
pricing whether rms advertise the same or di¤erent products, is somewhat sur-
prising. Intuition suggests that advertising di¤erent products ought to soften
price competition as it makes across rm price comparisons more blurred. It
appears the devil is in the model assumptions. The explanation, as argued
earlier, is that in the present model the advertised price is a su¢ cient statistic
for the consumers expected surplus. This is so since the reservation value of
the non-advertised good is the same for all consumers and is perfectly known to
rms. As a result, it does not matter for the consumer whether rms advertise
the same or di¤erent products. Hence rms are indi¤erent as to which good
to advertise since the choice doesnt a¤ect prots. I conjecture that in a more
general setting where reservation values di¤er among consumers or where rms
do not know consumersreservation values for certain, this might no longer be
the case.
The present model provides theoretical support to the ndings of Milyo and
Waldfogel (1999). In a study of the e¤ect of price advertising on prices in the
liquor retail market, Milyo and Waldfogel nd that advertising stores substan-
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tially cut only the prices of the products they advertise and moreover, that the
e¤ect of price advertising on prices is di¤erent depending on whether a rival
in the vicinity is advertising the same good. Advertised prices are much lower
if rivals close by are advertising the same good. Propositions 2 and 3 above
are in agreement with these ndings. Although tough competition for market
share leads to advertised prices below cost, the tough price competition does
not get (directly) transmitted to the non-advertised products. Instead, the
competition is transmitted from the non-advertised products to the advertised
products.
Our model also informs on the conditions giving rise to price dispersion.
As a corollary to Propositions 2-4 we have;
Corollary 2 Where advertising in necessary for the proper functioning of
markets, a su¢ cient condition for price dispersion is that rms advertise
di¤erent products.
When rms advertise similar products, the equilibrium is symmetric signi-
fying absence of price dispersion. Price dispersion for identical products arises
only if rms advertise di¤erent products21.
5 Concluding Remarks
I study price advertising when rms advertise only a subset of their products.
I nd some support for the empirical ndings that price advertising a¤ects
advertised and non-advertised prices di¤erently. I show that the degree of
product di¤erentiation is decisive for loss leader pricing. When di¤erentiation
is low, equilibrium is characterized by loss leader pricing while when products
are su¢ ciently di¤erent, equilibrium is characterized by low margin leader
pricing. Based on this analysis, I provide a game theoretic (and coherent)
explanation to the nding of Walters and Mackenzie (1988).
Assuming that consumersreservation values are known to rms, though
standard in the literature, masks potentially interesting dynamics. This as-
sumption, together with rationality, xes the price of the non-advertised good.
21A caveat is in order here. The result holds good provided rms nd it protable to
compete for the fully informed consumers. If the proportion of fully informed consumers is
small, we may have an asymmetric equilibrium in which one of the rms only sells to its
captive market and the other rm sells to its captive plus the fully informed consumers. In
this case price dispersion results even when rms advertise the same good.
17
However, in reality, this is not the case. Future research will consider relaxing
this assumption.
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